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Negotiating with Deity: Strategies
and Influences Related to Recent
North Korean Negotiating Behavior
Jesse D. Steele'
I. INTRODUCTION
As images of nuclear missiles flash across television screens and news
reports containing indiscernible Asian writing warn of conflict on the other
side of the world, this article addresses one of the single greatest threats to
global stability-the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis-and assesses
the negotiation strategies that have brought the world to its current situation.
By looking at the historical negotiation tactics that have been utilized by
each of the parties involved, particularly in light of societal norms and
cultural influences, one can ascertain a great deal of insight regarding each
party's respective strategies and objectives. This insight gleaned through
hindsight provides both the luxury of seeing the ramifications of past
decisions and the onus of harnessing such information in order to make wise
strategic decisions in the future.
When North Korea began developing nuclear weapons, the United
States convinced them to stop and had them sign a sheet of paper saying so. 2
Once the United States discovered that North Korea was still developing
nuclear weapons, the rest of the world got involved and convinced North
1. Jesse Steele is a JD/MBA/MDR candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law,
Graduate School of Business and Management, and Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution. He has
also studied at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) Graduate School
of Management in Seoul, South Korea.
2. See Eric Yong-Joong Lee, The Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Dispute
Resolution Under the IAEA Safeguards Regime, 5 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 101, 107 (2004)
(introducing the Agreed Framework reached between the United States and North Korea, in which
Pyongyang agreed to abandon its development of nuclear weapons); infra note 166 and
accompanying text (providing details regarding the establishment of the Agreed Framework and the
subsequent events undertaken by each party); Agreed Framework Between the United States of
America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, U.S.-N. Korea, 34 I.L.M.
603, available at http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf [hereinafter Agreed Framework]
(containing the actual text agreed upon by the United States and North Korea).
119
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Korea to sign another sheet of paper.3 A year later, North Korea detonated a
nuclear weapon.4 Then, the parties signed some more papers. 5 Through all
of the posturing and negotiating, both verbal and physical, what has the
world learned from and communicated to Kim Jong-Il ( o) once the
dust settles on the nuclear test site in North Korea? Possibly more
important, does the person occupying the opposite side of the negotiation
table genuinely believe that he is deity and is, thus, not bound by paper in
the first place?
The first section of this article describes the negotiation history, both
action-oriented and discussion-oriented, that has led to the current state of
affairs. The second section assesses the strategies that underlie each of the
implemented tactics and analyzes the consequences of such strategic
choices. Lastly, the third section of this article discusses Kim Jong-II's
delusion of deity and how it has possibly influenced North Korean
negotiation behavior.
II. NEGOTIATION HISTORY
A long and complex series of negotiations has led each of the parties
involved in this nuclear conflict to its current respective position. These
negotiations historically have taken both a physical form, forcefully
negotiating through action, and a verbal form, persuasively negotiating
through discussion. Careful analysis of each of these tactical choices,
including the timing of the choices and the manner in which each was
engaged, is critical in order to fully understand each party's underlying
negotiation strategy.
3. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (outlining the series of events after the Agreed
Framework that led up to the agreement reached in fourth round of talks in 2005-"September
Agreement"); Ja Young Elizabeth Kim, The Agreement After the Six-Party Talks: Are There No
Alternatives to the "Modified" Version of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework?-An Analysis of the
Newly-Adopted Framework and Its Significance for the Nuclear Proliferation Issues Relating to
North Korea, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 177, 194 (2007) (referring to the September Agreement,
which again promised the abandonment of a nuclear North Korea).
4. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (referring to the North Korean nuclear test on
October 9, 2006); John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 499 (2007) (stating that the detonation of a nuclear
device by North Korea proved that its nuclear weapons program was in violation of the September
Agreement).
5. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (referring to the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006); S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/76180.htm (containing the actual text of the resolution
sanctioning North Korea and condemning their nuclear endeavors).
120
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A. Physical Negotiation: Action Punctuated by Discussion (1994 - 2003)
After a relatively short but tumultuous history of North Korea
possessing nuclear power capabilities, focus quickly shifted to the possibility
of Kim Il-Sung's ( o ) regime using such power for the production of
nuclear weapons. 6  After hiding nuclear waste structures, denying
inspections, and withdrawing from the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the global community, represented by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), realized that the situation was
of grave importance.7  The situation, which constituted the first North
Korean nuclear crisis, "aroused shock waves, which reverberated throughout
the world.",8 In order to prevent further continuation down the destructive
spiral, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang (-°or) on
behalf of the United States and began negotiations that resulted in an
"Agreed Framework," seemingly suspending nuclear weapons
development. 9
Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear
reactors, while remaining a party to the NPT and permitting regular
inspections of its reactors in order to ensure compliance.' 0 In turn, the
6. Lee, supra note 2 (describing the history leading up to the Agreed Framework). "These
reactors had no real capacity to provide electricity but could produce uranium that might be enriched
to make nuclear weapons." Robert H. Mnookin, When Not to Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialist
Reflects on Appropriate Limits, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1077, 1097 (2003).
7. Lee, supra note 2, at 103-04. North Korea has, in fact, denied inspections many times
throughout history. Id. The specific denial referenced here was in regard to a 1993 request to
inspect certain facilities deemed suspicious by a U.S. intelligence satellite. Id. at 104-05. "[T]he
IAEA's Director General Han Blix formally demanded a 'special inspection' by March 25, 1993 of
the two facilities suspected to be storing nuclear waste." Id.
8. Id. at 105.
9. Id. at 107.
In his visit to Pyongyang in June 1994, President Carter discussed this crisis with Kim ll-
Sung and brought conciliatory messages. Following Carter's initiative, North Korea and
the United States opened diplomatic negotiations. After three months of highly charged
talks, the two sides reached an accord called the "Agreed Framework" in Geneva on
October 21, 1994. On November 4, 1994, the UN Security Council asked the IAEA to
carry out the tasks assigned to it in the Agreed Framework and, a week later, the IAEA
Board of Governors authorized the Director General to do so.
Id.
10. Agreed Framework, supra note 2, at 605. "[T]he DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities." Id.
Also, "[u]pon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and
3
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United States agreed to replace the reactors with light-water reactor power
plants (LWR) and to reduce trade barriers with the impoverished country. 1
The United States, South Korea, and Japan, under the name of the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), also agreed to
deliver temporary energy until the completion of the first LWR. 12
Things progressed as promised until 1998, when U.S. intelligence found
a subterranean facility in North Korea that had the capability to be used in
furtherance of nuclear weapon development in direct violation of the Agreed
Framework. 3 Within days, North Korea test-fired the Taepo Dong-1
missile over Japan. 14 Tensions continued to rise until 2002 when President
Bush branded North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" during his State of the
Union speech. ' North Korea responded by addressing this statement as
"little short of a declaration of war" and by pledging to "mercilessly wipe
out the aggressors."' 6  Shortly thereafter, North Korean officials admitted
possession of nuclear weaponry during a meeting with the U.S.
Ambassador.' 7  Through this statement, North Korea admitted that it
violated the Agreed Framework, which was already starting to wear thin. 18
routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect
to the facilities not subject to the freeze." Id. at 606.
11. Id. at 604-05. "Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants." Id. at 604. Also, "[t]he
two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations." Id. at 605.
12. Lee, supra note 2, at 110-11 (specifying that "KEDO was to deliver interim energy until
the first LWR was completed" and "carry out other measures deemed necessary for the attainment of
the purposes of the Agreed Framework"). Although KEDO involved three different countries, the
United States was considered the major proponent and the organization headquarters was located in
New York at the following address: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, 600 3rd
Avenue, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10004. See Agreed Framework, supra note 2. More
information about the KEDO organization can be ascertained by visiting the following site:
http://www.kedo.org.
13. Morse Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Past Failures, Present Solutions, 50 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 517, 532-33 (2006). Based upon this breach of the Agreed Framework, KEDO
stopped the oil shipments and LWR plans that they had undertaken in good faith. Id. at 533.
14. Kim, supra note 3, at 192.
15. Peter Carlson, Sins of the Son: Kim Jong Il's North Korea Is in Ruins, But Why Should
That Spoil His Fun?, WASH. POST, May 11, 2003, at Dl, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A40505-2003MayI 0?language=printer. President
Bush followed this assertion by stating that the regime was "arming with missiles and weapons of
mass destruction." Id.
16. Id. This is an example of the action-twisting, North Korean negotiating style later
discussed. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
17. Tan, supra note 13, at 533. However, this admission was later denied by North Korean
officials. Id.
18. Kim, supra note 3, at 180.
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The aforementioned actions began the unraveling process of what was
thought to have been a binding agreement but in actuality was proved to be
far from binding. Due to the breach of the Agreed Framework, KEDO
suspended energy shipments to North Korea and the LWR project. 19 In turn,
North Korea purged all outside inspectors from its soil and announced the
resumption of construction and operation of all its nuclear facilities, 20 which
have the capacity of producing dozens of nuclear warheads each year.21  The
United States then instituted a "Tailored Containment" policy, requiring
North Korea to scrap its nuclear program before further bilateral
negotiations between the two countries would resume.22
Japan's approach differed markedly by attempting to negotiate with
North Korea in a step-by-step manner but simultaneously expressing distrust
by launching two satellites that enabled independent monitoring of North
Korea, constructing a new intelligence headquarters, and initiating
acquisition of antimissile systems. 23 This negotiation tactic appeared to be
met with a modicum of success. Kim Jong-I1 apologized to the Prime
Minister of Japan for previously kidnapping Japanese citizens in order to
train North Korean spies, an extremely sore spot within the history of the
two countries, and a definite stumbling block in previous negotiation
attempts.24 Still, the countries' pledges to "sincerely tackle outstanding
19. Tan, supra note 13, at 533. This action was taken by the United States as a reactionary
measure to a perceived breach of contract. Id. However, North Korea viewed this U.S. action as the
true first breach of contract and used the action to justify its assertion that "it must develop and
produce nuclear weapons as a deterrent against potential American aggression." Id.
20. See id. (articulating North Korea's justification for such a move as needed protection
against the United States).
21. Erik Raines, North Korea: Analyzing the "New" Nuclear Threat, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 349, 366 (2004). The danger in this not only lies in the possibility of North Korea using
such weapons, but also, given North Korea's poor economy, "the potential risk of North Korea
selling nuclear weaponry to rogue states or terrorists with money to spend presents an extremely
ominous scenario." Id.
22. Richard P. Cronin, The North Korean Nuclear Threat and The U.S.-Japan Security
Alliance: Perceived Interests, Approaches, and Prospects, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter
2005, at 52-53.
23. Id. at 53-54. The Japanese govemment has taken a different approach and has sought "to
draw North Korea into step-by-step negotiations aimed at gradually persuading Kim Jong-[I]l that he
has more to gain from taking his country out of its isolation and becoming part of the global
economy than from maintaining his nuclear weapons program." Id. at 53.
24. Edward Kim, Give Violence a Chance, CHOSUN J., Sept. 17, 2002,
http://www.chosunjoumal.com/2002/09/17/give-violence-a-chance (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). "[Ihf
anything, th[isl [apology] was a double-insult toward South Korea's president. For one thing, Kim
Jong[-]I1 has offered no apology to South Korea for the North's kidnapping of South Koreans,
5
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problems based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving the
normalization" dissolved amidst increasing tensions with all other parties
involved.25
During this period, with the mindset that China exerted a large amount
of influence over North Korea, the United States repeatedly requested that
China leverage itself against the rogue nation.2 6  Accordingly, Chinese
officials warned North Korea not to act in a way that would strain U.S.-
China relations.27 In order to drive this warning home, China temporarily
flexed its muscle and briefly closed its oil pipeline to North Korea for three
days.2 8 This sent a clear message to the North Koreans that they needed to
"behave."
29
All the while, South Korea's Presidents, Kim Dae-Jung (=i-EH_) and
Roh Moo-Hyun (.-- ), attempted to maintain stability on the Korean
peninsula via the "Sunshine" and "Peace and Prosperity" policies,
respectively.3 Under these past two left-leaning presidents, South Korea
failed to raise human rights violations out of fear of angering Pyongyang and
pushed for wider communication channels, culminating in a dramatic
meeting with Kim Jong-I1 on North Korean soil in 2007.31 Such a
hundreds more than the Japanese victims, or for that matter, for the bombings of South Korean
airlines. And to add insult to injury, Kim Jong[-]ll was able to garner an apology from Koizumi for
Imperial Japan's atrocities committed during World War II, a stronger apology than any South
Korean president has been able to obtain from Tokyo thus far." Id.
25. Cronin, supra note 22, at 61-63. The "outstanding problems" referred to here are the
issues involving the previously mentioned kidnap victims, along with the overarching nuclear and
weaponry issues. Id. at 62.
26. John S. Park, Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks, WASH. Q., Autumn 2005, at 75,
83.
27. Id.
28. Id. The oil pipeline that was temporarily closed in March of 2003 ran from the Daqing
oilfields in China to North Korea. Id.
29. Id. However, such an ultimatum could easily backfire. Attempts to force a particular
action out of North Korea cannot cross the threshold of becoming too forceful and risk undermining
the stability of the rogue regime. Id. at 83-84.
30. Id. at 80. The reason behind such policies is a desire to avoid national insecurities due to
an immediate onslaught of North Korean defectors. Id. "Seoul seeks to avoid the massive costs that
a rapid reunification with Pyongyang would entail and instead achieve a gradual integration and
reunification of the two Koreas through South Korean direct investment and growing inter-Korean
trade." Id.
31. S. Korean President-Elect Indicates Tougher Stance on North, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec.
20, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/20/asia/AS-POL-SKorea-Presidential-
Election.php. However, South Korea has recently elected a new president, who does not share his
predecessors' fear. Id. President-elect Lee Myung-bak recently said that he will not withhold
criticism of North Korea's regime, "ending a taboo by a decade of liberal South Korean leaders who
have aggressively sought closer ties with Pyongyang." Id.
124
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disposition toward the North also bolstered its trade status with North Korea
to number two, only surpassed by China. 12
On other fronts, North Korea labeled the Tailored Containment policy of
the United States as "hostile" and finally withdrew from the NPT in January
of 2003.33 It also levied an ultimatum of its own, requiring the United States
to agree to a nonaggression pact before it would consider dismantling its
nuclear weapons program.34 Against this backdrop of events, the second
North Korean nuclear crisis arose.
B. Verbal Negotiation: Discussion Punctuated by Action (2003 - 2007)
"The Bush Administration's unyielding refusal to engage in bilateral
negotiations with North Korea caused speculation that the entire situation
could continue to spiral out of control. 35 In an attempt to prevent unbridled
escalation between the United States and North Korea, Chinese officials
convened a "face-saving trilateral meeting in Beijing," involving the United
States, North Korea, and China.36 These meetings produced sparse results
and the United States insisted that the nuclear issue was a "neighborhood
problem" that should involve every country that had a vested interest in the
Korean peninsula being a nuclear-free zone.37 In order to keep open
communication channels with Washington and hopefully to elicit a more
positive response from North Korea, the talks were expanded to include
Japan, South Korea, and Russia, in addition to the prior three members.38
These "Six-Party Talks" contained largely the same rhetoric as each
party had previously expressed, the only difference being that every party
32. Id.
33. Lee, supra note 2, at 115.
34. Raines, supra note 21, at 373. Such an ultimatum was levied in response to the United
States' precondition that Pyongyang completely and verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons
program before negotiations can resume. Id.
35. Park, supra note 26, at 76.
36. Id. This meeting was held in Beijing, China on April 23, 2003. Id. See also Lee, supra
note 2, at 117.
37. Park, supra note 26, at 76.
38. Id. None of the six-party talks have produced progress of substance because the United
States and North Korea still maintain their deep mistrust for one another, along with their rigid
negotiation strategies and objectives. Id. "Compounding this mistrust are other stumbling blocks in
the form of divergent policy constraints, both perceived and actual." Id.
7
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was now sitting together around a hexagonal table. 39  That arrangement
lasted until the fourth round of talks in September 2005 when North Korea
agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program (the September
Agreement). 40  However, this success was short-lived due to the fact that
North Korea would not remain on its best behavior. 4'
In the same month as the September Agreement, United States
authorities discovered that North Korea was using a Chinese bank, Banco
Delta Asia in Macao, to launder money and had Chinese officials freeze over
$25 million of involved funds.42 Then, in 2006, North Korea shocked the
world when it detonated a nuclear device, proving that its nuclear weapons
program was alive and strong.43 In the wake of this startling development,
the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1718 on North Korea, demanding abandonment of all nuclear weapons
programs and instituting harsh economic sanctions.44
After the Six-Party Talks resumed, the Bush Administration "reali[zed]
its containment policy was not working and it was time to start negotiating
seriously with a regime it once included in an 'axis of evil.' 45 Since this
foreign policy shift, the prospects for North Korean nuclear disarmament
39. Lee, supra note 2, at 117. During this meeting, both the United States and North Korea
clarified their positions on the nuclear issue. Id. However, this clarification merely reaffirmed that
the respective parties continued to hold mutually irreconcilable positions. Id. "North Korea's
objective was to construct a new level of relations leading to the normalization of ties with the
United States, and to obtain economic rewards for giving up its nuclear program." Id. at 117-18.
This is another example of the prevalent North Korean negotiating style discussed later in the text.
See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
40. Kim, supra note 3, at 194. "Under the September 19, 2005 agreement... North Korea
committed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs." Id. However, North Korea did not do so in
blatant terms. The September Agreement included the following language: "[T]he parties
'expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of
a light-water reactor to the DPRK."' Id. (citing Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
People's Republic of China, Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, § 1, cl. 6
(Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.).
41. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 185, 217 (2007). In October of 2006, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted economic sanctions against North Korea (Security Council Resolution 1718)
after it detonated a nuclear explosion. Id. at 218.
42. Crook, supra note 4, at 500. "The United States in late March 2007 agreed to the release
of the funds to an account in the Trade Bank of the Bank of China, where they would be used by
North Korea for 'humanitarian and educational' purposes. However, as of the date of this writing
(April 2007), the funds have not been transferred." Id.
43. Id.
44. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 5; see also Crook, supra note 41, at 118.
45. Anna Fifield, North Korea: Pyongyang Plays Tactics, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at South
Korea-Special Report 1, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fafl630e-81If-Ildc-9f14-
0000779fd2ac,dwpuuid=f78e936e-81 ld-I 1dc-9f14-0000779fd2ac.html?nclickcheck=l.
8
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have dramatically done an about-face.46 In 2007, during the third round of
the fifth phase of talks, North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear reactors
and to verifiably declare the entirety of its atomic programs by the end of the
year.47 In retum, the regime was to be removed from the U.S. terrorism
blacklist and to be compensated with one million tons of heavy oil to be
used for energy purposes. 48  As North Korea began to disable its nuclear
facilities and allow inspectors in to monitor progress, the global community
released a sigh of relief.
C. Looking Into the Future: Repeating the Past
As this article is being written, the words "North Korea" are running
across the news ticker on virtually every major media outlet.49  The
December 31, 2007 deadline to provide a complete list of its nuclear arms
programs has passed, and North Korea has yet to deliver on its promise.5 °
Pyongyang says that it has drawn up the list and notified the six-parties as it
was required to do, but none of the other six parties has received the list.51
North Korea also issued a statement saying, "[We] will further strengthen
our war deterrent capabilities in response to U.S. attempts to initiate nuclear
war."52 However, the United States, along with the other Six-Party powers,
46. Id. In fact, "[tioday, the prospects for a nuclear weapons-free North Korea have never
looked so good." Id.
47. N. Korea: U.S. Not Delivering Aid, CNN.CoM, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/01/04/nkorea.nuclear.ap/index/html (last visited Jan. 4,
2008).
48. Yoo Choonsik & Jon Herskovitz, Nuclear Declaration Submitted, Says North Korea,
REUTERS INDIA, Jan. 4, 2008, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idlNIndia-
31250020080104.
49. See supra notes 47-48; Yoo Choonsik & Jon Herskovitz, U.S. Says Still Waiting for N.
Korean Nuclear Inventory, REUTERS INDIA, Jan. 4, 2008, available at
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idlNIndia-31253220080104.
50. Choonsik & Herskovitz, supra note 49. According to Gordon Johndroe, a White House
representative, "[ulnfortunately, we have not yet received a complete and correct declaration and we
urge North Korea to deliver one soon so that we can all get the benefits offered in the six-party
process." Id.
51. Id. When "[a]sked why North Korea would make a public assertion that all of the other
five negotiating partners knew to be false, [a State Department spokesman] said: 'They're engaging
the international media in their own way. It's just all part of the diplomatic process - you have
private dialogue and you also have private statements."' Id.
52. Choonsik & Herskovitz, supra note 48. "The North, with one of the world's largest
standing armies, usually threatens to bolster its deterrent, often taken to be a reference to its nuclear
arsenal, when it feels international powers are not treating it properly." Id.
9
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reacted mildly and urged North Korea to fulfill the declaration promise
soon.5 3 Only the future will tell if the peaceful developments of the 2007
agreement will come to fruition or if the past will repeat itself. 14
III. UNDERLYING NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
Negotiation strategies are not stand-alone constructs but are carefully
interwoven systems of initiations and responses related to the information,
either verbal or physical, exchanged between negotiation counterparts.
Therefore, it is crucial to know the negotiation strategies of each of the
parties involved and to scrutinize those strategies in order to have an
accurate big-picture understanding of the situation. Once this contextual
understanding is ascertained and assessed, it provides a foundation to
analyze potential influences upon each strategy.
A. United States: "Axis of Evil" & "Tailored Containment"
i. "Axis of Evil"
It has been alleged that, "[f]or the past fifty years, North Korea has lied,
broken its word, and pushed tensions to the brink of war, and negotiations
with this country have routinely been unproductive, if not outright
failures."'55 It is this type of thinking that may have spumed President Bush
to brand North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" during his State of the
Union speech in 2002.56 In an effort to strike fear in the heart of Kim Jong-
I1 and to make it known that such behavior would not be tolerated, President
Bush denounced the regime in some of the harshest terms possible in front
of the entire world. 57
However, this acute personal attack may have inadvertently had the
opposite effect. By naming North Korea as an evil empire in such a public
53. Choonsik & Herskovitz, supra note 49.
54. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
55. Tan, supra note 13, at 519. See infra note 166 and accompanying text, for a chronological
list of past negotiation behavior, specifically the past fifteen years and the events surrounding the
Six-Party talks in Beijing.
56. Carlson, supra note 15.
57. Kim, supra note 24. According to Kim, in addition to the "Axis of Evil" comment,
President Bush's related "credible threat of violence ... put the fear of God into the Dear Leader."
Id. The result of which was the groundbreaking apology by Kim Jong-Il to the Japanese government
for the historical kidnappings, which was previously discussed in Section 11(a). See id.
128
10
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forum, President Bush forced Pyongyang into a corner.18  "Those three
words-'axis of evil'-may have [had] more of a bombshell impact on Kim
Jong-II's anger and mentality, and his perception toward the [Bush]
administration than anything else."5 9 In addition to whatever motivations
North Korea previously had, it now also desires revenge for losing face in
front of the rest of the globe and will seek to discredit the United States in
whatever way possible to detract from the message of its accusers.60
By using the word "evil" in relation to the United States' negotiation
counterpart, President Bush did not leave much room for dialogue or
discussion.61 As succinctly stated by a presidential scholar in relation to this
North Korean nuclear crisis, "'How do you negotiate with evil?"' 62  This
glorified name-calling effectively closed down already strained
communication channels without achieving any possible objective that may
have been intended.63
Since this incident, the United States' tone has shifted. 64 President Bush
has adopted a more conciliatory tone and has ceased using such harsh
58. Interview with Hyo Young Kang, Member, Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful
Unification of Korea (Dec. 10, 2007) (transcript of interview on record with the author). Mr. Kang
currently holds the position of senior foreign counsel at Yulchon Attorney at Law in Seoul, South
Korea, and "practices primarily in the areas of finance and international capital markets law. Before
joining Yulchon, he was a partner at Allen & Overy in Hong Kong and head of their Korea practice.
In addition to over ten years working at Allen & Overy, he also worked at Kim & Chang in Seoul for
nearly seven years." Yulchon Attorneys at Law: Professionals,
http://www.yulchon.com/lawyer-en/lawyer_view.asp?pid=91 &jaso=l 0&cate=&search-type=&se
arch word= (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). Holding a B.S. degree from Duke University, and a J.D.
degree from Georgetown University Law Center, Mr. Kang speaks both English and Korean, and is
admitted to the respective bar organizations of Maryland (USA), Hong Kong, and England and
Wales. Id. Further information about Mr. Hyo Young Kang is available on the Yulchon Attorneys
at Law website. See id. Special thanks to Mr. Kang for participating in this interview and sharing
his insight on this important issue.
59. The Many Faces of Kim Jong-ll, CNN.CoM, Apr. 19, 2004,
http://edition.cnn.com/2004IWORLD/americas/04/16/kim/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2008) (quoting
Kongdan Oh of the Brookings Institution).
60. Kang, supra note 58.
61. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1105. After branding a country as "Evil," negotiating with them
"could also be perceived as 'doing business with the devil."' Id. at 1104. North Korea undoubtedly
has a terrible human rights record and the totalitarian regime stifles its impoverished people. Id. at
1104-05. "Doing a deal with such a regime, quite apart from imposing domestic political costs given
Congressional hostility to North Korea, might be seen by some as morally dubious." Id. at 1105.
62. Id. (quoting Davis Houck, a professor at Florida State University).
63. Kang, supra note 58.
64. Sung-Yoon Lee, The Mythical Nuclear Kingdom of North Korea, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF., Summer 2005, at 139.
11
Steele: Negotiating with Deity: Strategies and Influences Related to Rece
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2008
language, most notably in the State of the Union Address in 2005.65 This
shift has at least deprived North Korea of the ability to claim that a "hostile"
stance is being held by the United States, a potential reason for refusing to
return to the discussion table.66 However, the United States has not
completely abandoned such tactics, as witnessed by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice labeling the regime as an "outpost of tyranny. '67
ii. "Tailored Containment"
A party's reputation plays a key role in its ability to truly negotiate
effectively.68 In fact, because its reputation can even provide increased
power before the party ever comes to the negotiation table, it is of the utmost
importance to protect a pristine reputation.69 Therefore, one of the foremost
concerns in the eyes of the United States is protecting the reputation that it
65. Id.
The 2005 State of the Union Address has now come and gone, and in his speech Bush
exercised restraint and chose not to use any inflammatory rhetoric against North Korea.
Compared to what he had to say about Iran, the other of the two remaining "axis-of-evil"
charter states, Bush's comments on North Korea were measured to the point of insipid:
"We are working closely with governments in Asia to convince North Korea to abandon
its nuclear ambitions."
Id.
66. Id. Since removing itself from the Six-Party Talks' fourth round, North Korea has given
many reasons for postponing the continuation of negotiations; however, one of them was not, and
could not have been, hostility on behalf of the United States. Id. These reasons were:
[Flirst, it said that it would wait for the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in
November; second, it would wait until the formation of Bush's second-term North Korea
policy team; third, that it would wait until the State of the Union Address to ascertain
whether the United States would negotiate in good faith.
Id.
67. Lee, supra note 64. North Korea has also demanded an apology for this "outpost of
tyranny" comment made by Secretary of State Rice. Id.
68. Charles A. Goldstein & Sarah L. Weber, The Art of Negotiating, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
325,328 (1992).
69. Id. However, the opposite is not necessarily true, and the United States should keep this is
mind when negotiating with North Korea. Id.
[Y]ou should never underestimate your opponent, whatever his or her reputation may be.
Preconceived notions about your opponent based on the opinions of others can prove
very dangerous. They may lead you to fail to perceive opportunities when you can gain
significant advantages in the deal, or-worse-to assume inappropriately aggressive
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abides by the agreements it makes and unwaveringly expecting its
counterpart to do so as well.70
The United States' perceived attitude of North Korea, viewed as
regularly not keeping its word, testing missiles, and resuming nuclear
weapon development, causes many people to question the worth of
expending so much energy in a presumably futile endeavor.71 Many
Americans view North Korea as incapable of negotiating because it "acts
and speaks in a crazy and irrational manner" regarding its nuclear weapons
program. Upon this framework, the Bush Administration announced its
policy of Tailored Containment, mandating a precondition that North Korea
must discontinue all nuclear development before the United States will
resume negotiations.73
It is apparent that President Bush and his governmental officials worried
about the precedent that would be set by continued negotiations with the
regime.7 4  The United States' standpoint was that such actions could not
only "encourage nuclear blackmail by other rogue nations" but also could
encourage other nations that were hostile to the United States to begin
developing nuclear weapons in hopes of later being compensated by the
United States for discontinuance of that development.75 In such a case,
some believed that negotiation would send an inappropriate message that
would essentially make the overall situation worse.7 6
In relation to North Korea specifically, the strategy that was adopted
held that past misbehavior would not be rewarded.77 The United States
believed that, throughout past dealings, Pyongyang had consistently
attempted to create new friction and, then, had subsequently extracted
70. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1104. "Administration officials have suggested that a new deal
with the North Koreans would send a message that we are willing to pay twice for the same
promise." Id.
71. See Kim, supra note 3, at 196; Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1103-04.
72. Tan, supra note 13, at 533 n.138.
73. Cronin, supra note 22, at 53.
74. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1104.
75. Id. "Successfully facing down North Korea would send a message that the world will not
tolerate nuclear blackmail. Failing to do so will send a very different message to rogue states-that
if you don't want to be treated like Iraq, get your bomb before facing off against Washington."
David E. Sanger, The World; Next Question: How to Stop Nuclear Blaclanail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2002, Week in Review, at 1, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9BO5E7DBI E3FF93AA35750C0A9659C8B63.
76. See Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1104.
77. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1104.
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additional concessions in order to take deescalating measures that it had
already agreed to take.7 8  According to former Secretary of State Colin
Powell, negotiation with North Korea after its flaunting of prior agreements
would equate to "appeasing misbehavior., 79 Essentially, it was thought that
continued negotiations with Pyongyang would have indicated that the United
States was "willing to pay twice for the same promise."80
However, even though hindsight does not necessarily indicate for sure,
this strategy may have also inadvertently played into North Korea's hand.8 '
Harvard Law School Program on Negotiation's Robert Bordone and Albert
Chang state that "[t]he decision to play chicken with the North Koreans in
2003 gave them precisely what they wanted-plenty of time to develop their
own nuclear capabilities. '8 2  Since then, the administration has continued to
reject proposals of bilateral talks based upon this strategy but has accepted
multilateral talks, which get North Korea back to the table a0d cut its nuclear
development time without sacrificing the United States principle of not
rewarding bad behavior.83 Also, such a strategy may provide North Korean
authorities with a face-saving opportunity to reach further agreements. 84
78. Lee, supra note 64, at 140.
79. Id. (citing U.S.: North Korea Must Reverse Course, CHt. TRIB., Dec. 31, 2002, Redeye
Edition, at 4).
80. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1104.
81. See Robert C. Bordone & Albert Chang, Real Superpowers Negotiate,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Oct. 26, 2006,
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/news/2006/news bordone.wash.post.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
"As an initial gut reaction to abhorrent North Korean behavior in 2003, this response may have been
understandable. But from a perspective of accomplishing the goal of denuclearizing North Korea,
this policy continues to be a demonstrable failure." Id.
82. Id. In fact, the authors go as far as labeling this strategy as a "silly game" that yields
inferior results, compared to "listening and talking-at bilateral, multilateral, and second-track
levels." Id.
83. Id. It is further suggested that this is not good enough and virtually every avenue of
"talks" should be engaged. Id.
[Tihere is no reason that bilateral and multilateral talks cannot co-exist. The
Administration should continue to encourage coordinated Six Party Talks but also engage
with North Korea on a one-on-one basis at the track-l diplomatic level. This way, the
U.S. leverages Chinese and South Korean support on North Korea while still engaging
with Pyongyang in a direct dialogue. Bilateral talks would also show our partners in
China and South Korea that we are responsive to their preferences for a more diplomatic
approach.
Id. Compare Bordone & Chang, supra note 81 (suggesting that bilateral negotiations between the
U.S. and North Korea would show diplomacy), with Mnookin, supra note 6, at 1104 (suggesting that
bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea would show weakness).
84. Bordone & Chang, supra note 81. Simultaneously, such a face-saving move for the North
Koreans could assist the United States in saving face with the global community in regard to its
reputation for frequently overlooking diplomacy. Id.
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B. South Korea: "Sunshine Policy"
Because South Korean president Roh Moo-Hyun has primarily been
concerned with maintaining stability and security on the Korean peninsula,
he implemented a "Peace and Prosperity Policy," piggybacking on his
predecessor's "Sunshine Policy."85 As virtually the same plan with merely
two different names, both policies engaged North Korea, largely refrained
from criticizing its abundant human rights infractions, and bolstered South
Korea's trade status with its northern neighbor.86 South Korean officials
have made it very clear that the strategy behind such policies has been
directed mainly at preventing a sudden regime collapse, which would result
in millions of northern refugees flooding South Korea.87
As intended, the regime has yet to suddenly collapse. However,
possibly unintended, this strategy has encouraged Kim Jong-I1 and his North
Korean policies. 8 Some people allege that the left-of-center South Korean
government seems as if it is more interested in placating North Korea than
changing it.89 "At times the South Korean president even sounds like an
official spokesperson for the Kim regime, undermining the whole process of
the Six-Party Talks and its stated goal: that the five nations gathered to
persuade the North Korean regime will 'not tolerate' a nuclear North
Korea." 90
Based upon the recent South Korean presidential elections of December
2007, the negotiation strategy of South Korea will likely shift to a much
tougher stance. 91  President-elect Lee Myung-Bak (01E29-') has stated that
85. Park, supra note 26, at 80.
86. Lee to Toughen Stance on North Korea, CNN.COM, Dec. 20, 2007,
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/12/19/skorea.election/index.html?eref-editionasia
(last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
87. John Gittings & Oliver Burkeman, Bush Seeks to Turn Screw on N. Korea: 'Tailored
Containment' Policy, DAWN, Dec. 31, 2002, http://www.dawn.com/2002/12/31/intl3.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2008); see also S. Korean President-Elect Indicates Tougher Stance on North, supra
note 31.
88. Gittings & Burkeman, supra note 87; see also S. Korean President-Elect Indicates
Tougher Stance on North, supra note 31 (discussing the economic trade benefits for North Korea
that have arisen out of these policies and how they encourage continuation of the same behavior).
89. Lee, supra note 64, at 140.
90. Id. Because of this, South Korea is very rarely considered by the major denuclearization
parties as a possible catalyst for bringing about any major changes within the stalemate with
Pyongyang. Id.
91. Lee to Toughen Stance on North Korea, supra note 86. "Lee pledged to work for a
nuclear-free Korean peninsula and strengthen Seoul's alliance with the United States. 'The most
15
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he does not plan to refrain from criticizing North Korea's egregious human
rights violations, as his predecessors have strategically done.92 He said, "If
we try to point out North Korea's shortcomings, with affection, I think that
would make North Korean society healthier., 93  Also, he plans on only




It is readily apparent that, by sharing a geographical border, large trade
agreements, and a Communist ideology with Kim Jong-I1, China is in a
unique position to facilitate negotiations between North Korea and the rest
of the world or, at least, to wield a modicum of influence over the otherwise
uncontrollable nation.95 At a time when the United States and North Korea
came to a stalemate over bilateral talks, China intervened and created a face-
saving opportunity for discussions to be held in a trilateral setting.9 6 Later, it
went further to acclimate the United States' desire to get the entire
"neighborhood" involved and hosted the Six-Party Talks in Beijing.97
However, the level of China's altruism is up for debate. According to
Chinese officials, the strategy of assuming the mediator role arose from a
strong belief that "dialogu[ing] and practic[ing] more patience [will] ensure
important thing is for North Korea to get rid of its nuclear weapons,' he said[.]" Id.; see also S.
Korean President-Elect Indicates Tougher Stance on North, supra note 31 (stating that President Lee
does not fear offending the North, as prior presidents have avoided).
92. S. Korean President-Elect Indicates Tougher Stance on North, supra note 31. Mr. Lee has
been recorded saying in a news conference, "'I think unconditionally avoiding criticism of North
Korea would not be appropriate .... ' Lee to Toughen Stance on North Korea, supra note 86.
93. S. Korean President-Elect Indicates Tougher Stance on North, supra note 31; see also Lee
to Toughen Stance on North Korea, supra note 86.
94. S. Korean President-Elect Indicates Tougher Stance on North, supra note 31. Not only
has Mr. Lee aligned with U.S. strategy, but he has also become quite friendly with U.S. leaders. Id.
"Lee spoke by phone with U.S. President George W. Bush, pledging to strengthen relations with
Washington and to work together to resolve the standoff over North Korea's nuclear programs ....
Id.
95. See Park, supra note 26, at 82. The importance of sharing a geographical border is at least
two-fold, if not more. Id. Not only is it important for normal, positive neighborly relations, such as
commerce and trade, but also, "[s]hould the nuclear crisis spiral out of control and lead to an armed
confrontation between North Korea and the United States, Beijing is concerned about the prospect of
U.S. forces on its border and a flood of North Korean refugees streaming into northern China." Id.
at 83.
96. Id. at 76.
97. Id. The six parties that were involved in the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing were: North
Korea, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Id.; see also infra note 166 and
accompanying text (showing a timeline of the events surrounding the Six-Party talks).
134
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that the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons." 98 But, many others
believe that the Chinese involvement is more of a calculated step towards
achieving global influence and economic gain. A primary objective of
China is to drastically increase its per capita gross domestic product, and by
gaining the favor of many international superpowers through assisting in
mediation, China can foster increased foreign investment into its country.
99
Concurrently, China can possibly use this opportunity to gain global power
and influence, while simultaneously furthering its position of eventually
turning North Korea into a satellite nation. 00
D. North Korea: "Appeasing Misbehavior"
It is a common allegation that even a cursory glance at North Korea's
past negotiation strategies, both through discussion and action, shows that it
is commonplace for one-thing to be said and another thing to be done.' 0'
According to this view, lying, deception, and broken promises by North
Korea are not isolated instances but are truly the standard mode of
operation. 102 In fact, "it is half expected that [North Korea] will take the
action that is in its best interest at any given time," regardless of what has
been previously promised.
03
In general, Pyongyang negotiators view negotiations as "war by other
means."' 1 4  As is the case with many other Communist countries, North
98. Park, supra note 26, at 84. Sha Zukang, a former Chinese arms control ambassador, made
the following statement: "Dialogue and consultation is the best way to reach consensus on problem
matters. We should recognize that North Korea has legitimate security concerns. We need to
continue the dialogue and practice more patience to ensure that the Korean peninsula is free of
nuclear weapons." Id.
99. Id. at 81-82. A major factor involved in Chinese policy decisions is the concept of
"xiaokang," which embodies the desire for the vast majority of Chinese people to maintain a middle-
class lifestyle. Id. at 82. One "objective of xiaokang is to attain a $3,000 per capita gross domestic
product by 2020." Id. In order for this objective to be accomplished, there must be political and
economic stability in the region. Id. at 81-82.
100. Kang, supra note 58.
101. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
102. Tan, supra note 13, at 536; see also infra text accompanying note 112 (providing the five
steps involved in North Korean negotiation strategy, clearly identifying examples of lying,
deception, and broken promises).
103. Kang, supra note 58.
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Korea considers negotiations to be simply another battlefront.'0 5
Negotiators seek not to be "compromisers" but consider themselves to be
"fighters."' 10 6  Therefore, negotiation takes on a militaristic quality in the
sense that negotiators focus solely upon full achievement of their goals. 107
Negotiators push mightily for concessions from their opposition and are
more than willing to threaten violence if they do not receive those
concessions or if their opposition dares to request reciprocal behavior.' 8
Eventually, if negotiators ever run into a situation where it becomes apparent
their opposition will not acquiesce to their demands, North Korean strategy
mandates that they suspend talks and walk away from the table. 109 In their
mindset, negotiators view concession to be synonymous with defeat. "0
If this is truly the mindset of North Korean authorities, it seems odd that
they would even enter into negotiations in the first place. However, based
on North Korean indoctrination, "the purpose of holding dialogue is to bide
time and weaken [their] enemies, as well as to obtain favorable international
opinion. Furthermore, it can be considered a revolutionary offensive tactic
for driving the enemy into a comer.""' According to Admiral C. Turner
Joy, author of How Communists Negotiate, "Communists are not
embarrassed in the least to deny an agreement already reached, [and they]
105. Song Jong-hwan, North Korean Negotiating Behavior: A Cultural Approach, 15 E. ASIAN
REV. 87, 95 (2003). The North Korean negotiators involved are extremely learned in the
revolutionary negotiation styles of other Communist counties, such as China and the Soviet Union.
Id. "It is clear that North Korea still follows the teachings of Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung." Id. at 92.
106. Id. at 95.
107. Id. Because North Koreans adhere to a warrior mentality, they argue that "the goal of
negotiations is complete victory," and "[their mentality] regards any compromise or contract with
the counterpart as either a defeat or as an unfinished task." Id.
108. Id. Although past behavior has indicated a willingness, and even a propensity, to behave
in this manner, it has not always been deemed the wisest choice strategically, and thus, has not been
employed. Id. The factor that determines which move would be most prudent is the overriding
philosophy behind North Korea negotiation: power politics. Id. As an extrapolation:
The North employs different tactics against the U.S. and South Korea. Their tactics also
vary, depending on the counterpart's stance. Since the North proceeds on the basis of
power, any courtesies or polite words from the South result in more extreme demands by
the North. Conversely, more inflexibility from the South elicits more courteous
negotiation behavior from the North.
Id. at 96.
109. Id. Suspension will usually be predicated upon an "outside directive." Id.
110. Id. at 97. This is shown by Pyongyang's history of incessantly pushing an identical
proposal without concession and quibbling over even the most miniscule variances: "Even when
they are forced to reach a compromise with their counterparts, they try to emphasize the legitimacy
of their original proposal and conceal their concession." Id.
11. Jong-hwan, supra note 105, at 92. This quote was given by Kim-l-Sung himself, while
ordering the military to dig tunnels into the demilitarized zone that could later be used for infiltration
into South Korea. Id. at 91-92.
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simply state that your interpretation is an incorrect one."' 12  Thus, in the
mind of North Koreans, negotiation is simply "a means to an end:
Revolution."' 
13
The pattern of "brinkmanship" or "negotiating on the edge" that North
Korea generally employs follows five steps:
(1) escalate the crisis; (2) use it to gain bargaining leverage to get the desired parties
(most particularly the United States) to the table; (3) as a result of the crisis, to come to
an agreement, which (4) gives North Korea benefits, which it swallows; and then (5) not
abide by its promises, break the agreement, and create another crisis - thus starting the
cycle again.
Such a strategy calls for North Korea to attempt to spin the situation in a
way that makes an unaware onlooker think the opposition is to blame. For
example, North Korean officials attempted to blame the United States during
a public announcement in which North Korea stated that it possessed nuclear
weapons:
The U.S. disclosed its attempt to topple the political system in the DPRK at any cost,
threatening it with a nuclear stick. This compels us [sic] to take a measure to bolster its
nuclear weapons arsenal in order to protect the ideology, system, freedom and democracy
chosen by its people. 115
112. SNYDER, supra note 104, at 11. This is merely one of many tactics frequently used in
Communist-influenced negotiation techniques. Others include:
[A]ttempts to 'load' the agenda in order to create a context for one-sided concessions,
psychological warfare conducted through incidents away from the negotiating table,
delaying progress in order to wear down the opponent, making minimal commitments
while extracting maximal concessions, dishonoring commitments already made,
maintaining a veto in practice over the enforcement of agreements, raising 'red herrings'
in the course of negotiations, denying or distorting the truth, pocketing concessions
instead of offering an equal concession in turn, and agreeing to an item in principle and
later applying a different interpretation to its content or significance.
Id.
113. Jong-hwan, supra note 105, at 92.
114. Tan, supra note 13, at 536 (citing SNYDER, supra note 104, at 68-96). See infra note 164
and accompanying text, for a list of the events surrounding the Six-Party talks in Beijing, which give
historical examples of these five steps.
115. Lee, supra note 64, at 130. U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, described this
assertion by North Korea as "ridiculous" and stated that "the United States has no war plans against
North Korea presently. These recent accusations amount to nothing more than the continued
spewing of the North Korean propaganda machine and the lineup of lies that it regularly puts forth to
its populace." Tan, supra note 13, at 537.
19
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This is a frequent strategy taken by North Korea, which has one of the
largest armies in the world, and such threats usually emerge when it feels as
if it is not being treated appropriately. "16
In further illumination, "North Korea ma[de] demands on the United
States for 'direct talks' and a 'non-aggression pact' in order to create the
illusion that it is pursuing peace and diplomacy while a hostile America goes
on spuming its well-intended overtures."' 17 Since the outset of the Six-Party
Talks, North Korea wanted direct access to United States decision makers,
through bilateral negotiations, because it viewed the United States as the
only major contender on the issue of maintaining a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula." 8  This is compatible with the general principle that Korean
culture seeks to exclude intermediaries and go straight to the entity that
possesses final, binding authority." 9 The fact that North Korea viewed the
United States, above South Korea, as such a binding authority, may be
indicative of its assessment of both the United States and South Korean
negotiation strategies.
Applying all of these principles to the current situation, many believe
that Pyongyang's current cooperative stance is primarily tactical.2 0 One
reason for this strategy could be the fact that the recent South Korean
presidential elections were approaching.' 2' North Korea likely desired to
give off the impression that it was being cooperative in order to gain the
election of another South Korean official with a "Sunshine Policy" bent. 1
22
116. Choonsik & Herskovitz,supra note 48.
117. Lee, supra note 64, at 136. Even if the United States were to abandon the multi-party talks
in pursuit of direct talks per the request of Pyongyang, the odds are that the situation would become
worse, rather than better. See id. "In any exclusive bilateral setting, North Korea will make false
accusations, unreasonable demands, and create the impression that the inflexible position of the
United States is the chief obstacle to reaching a negotiated settlement." Id.
118. Lee, supra note 2, at 120.
119. Interview with Jae-Woo Lee, Director, Korean Commercial Arbitration Board Deputy
(Sept. 24, 2007) (transcript of interview on record with the author). Mr. Lee is a member of the
International Cooperation department of the KCAB, the FTA Monitoring Centre, and was
particularly helpful in explaining the Korean legal system's treatment of international affairs. More
information about the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board can be seen on their website:
http://www.kcab.or.kr. Special thanks to Mr. Lee for participating in this interview and sharing his
insight on this important issue.
120. Fifield, supra note 45.
121. Id. Paik Jin-hyun, one of Seoul National University's international relations professors,
stated, "'I think that North Korea's recent willingness to co-operate is very much tactical, especially
with the South Korean election coming in December... By holding the summit, the North Koreans
were trying to create the impression among South Koreans that it is co-operating and will continue to
do so if they continue with engagement."' Id.
122. See id.
20
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Another reason for this strategy is North Korea's desire to reach a new
level of relations, in further pursuit of normalization with the United States,
in order to gain large economic rewards in exchange for abdicating its
nuclear program.123 North Korea wields its potential as a nuclear threat in
order to prevent military attacks and to force the world into high-level
negotiations. 124 If Kim Jong-I1 can achieve his objective of trading
assurances that he will discontinue his nuclear weapon development, he may
be able to receive enough economic benefits and security guarantees that his
regime can continue into the foreseeable future. 
25
The negotiation strategy of North Korea, in an action-oriented sense,
became interwoven with that of the remaining five parties with regard to one
specific point of verbal agreement: Yongbyon (1 "1). From the North
Korean standpoint, following through with the verbal commitment of
disabling the Yongbyon nuclear reactor was deemed to be an appropriate
tactic in February of 2007. In the eyes of the remaining five parties, the
disablement of the nuclear facilities caused North Korea, at least
temporarily, to be unable to continue nuclear weapons development.
1 26
Further, they believed that even if North Korea were to restart the facility's
operations, its development would be delayed two to three years. 1
27
IV. KNOWING YOUR NEGOTIATION COUNTERPART
Delusion of Deity: An Unspoken Influence upon North Korean
Negotiation Strategy
123. Lee, supra note 2, at 118. Once again, this is an example seeking compensation for
ceasing bad behavior, a frequent tactic used in brinkmanship style negotiations. See Tan, supra note
13, at 536.
124. See Raven Winters, Note, Preventing Repeat Offenders: North Korea's Withdrawal and
the Need for Revisions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1499,
1508 (2005). This assertion is based upon the fact that the North has previously engaged in the exact
same behavior in the past, resulting in the "Agreed Framework." See id.
125. Katy Oh & Ralph Hassig, Kim Jong-il Through the Looking Glass, in DPRK BRIEFING
BOOK (2003), available at
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/negotiating/ProfileofKimJong-il.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2008). In fact, the author goes on to say that success in this objective could allow Kim Jong-ll to
rule for as long as the regime of his father, Kim l-Sung. Id.
126. Fifield, supra note 45. According to Mr. Ralph Cossa, head of the Pacific Forum of the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, "[w]ith the disabling of the Yongbyon facilities, North
Korea will be unable to produce more weapons-grade plutonium. This is a major step forward." Id.
127. Kang, supra note 58.
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When foreigners study Korean culture, they are often surprised to learn
the extent to which Kim Jong-Il deifies his father and himself, along with the
extent to which his leadership rests on such propaganda.' 28  Such
information can lend interesting insight into the mindset behind North
Korean negotiation strategy. When applying this unique deity doctrine to
particular strategic steps taken by the Kim Jong-I1 regime, North Korean
reasoning becomes slightly less puzzling.
The official North Korean myth of Kim Jong-II holds that he was born
upon the top of a Korean mountain peak next to the heavens and that the
earth celebrated this joyous occasion. 129 Simultaneously, the heavens parted
with a double rainbow, a new star began to blaze, and a flying swallow
greeted the divine newborn. 3 0 Such miracles heralded the cataclysmic birth
of a "'general who w[ould] rule all the world."",13 1  Upon viewing these
wonders, a soldier carved a message into a nearby tree: "'Oh, Korea, I
announce the birth of the Star of Paekdu."" 3 2  Further, Kim Jong-II's
presence is said to cause snow to melt and trees to instantaneously bloom. 1
33
Also, he allegedly injects himself with blood from virgins in order to retain
his youth, authored a book almost every single day while he was in college,
and shot a hole-in-one on his first venture to the golf course. 134 Since his
youngest days, Kim Jong-Il grew up hearing everyone around him telling
him that he was "the son of God."' 35 His father (the "Great Leader") gave
him the title "Dear Leader" and addressed him as "a genius of 10,000
talents." 136
128. See Lee, supra note 64, at 129. The amount to which the North Korean public adheres to
Kim Jong-l's deification attests to the high caliber of the Pyongyang propaganda machine, "which
apparently remains effective despite churning out chimerical tales..." Id.
129. Id. at 125-26; see also The Many Faces of Kim Jong-II, supra note 59.
130. Lee, supra note 64, at 125-26. Actually, western historians assert that Kim Jong-lI was
born in a Siberian army camp, "where his father, Kim 11 Sung, and his tiny band of communist
guerrillas had fled to escape the Japanese." Carlson, supra note 15.
131. Carlson, supra note 15.
132. Id.
133. Id. These far-fetched assertions have emerged from the cloud of fairy-tales that surrounds
Kim Jong-Il. "[T]he truth is hard to locate, lost in the thicket of official North Korean mythology
and the wild rumors spread by the South Korean media." Id.
134. Carlson, supra note 15. The truth, distinctly in contrast to the myths that abound, is that
Kim Jong-Il is a "pudgy 5-foot-3-inch Stalinist who wears elevator shoes and a puffy pompadour in
an unsuccessful attempt to gain stature." Id. He also has a keen liking of cartoons, "kitschy
artifice," and, most of all, himself. Id.
135. The Many Faces of Kim Jong-ll, supra note 59. This stands in shocking contrast to the
vast majority of North Koreans, who grew up destitute, if they were lucky enough to have enough
sustenance to survive. Id.
136. Carlson, supra note 15.
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In fact, such mythology stems directly from the deification of Kim Jong-
II's father and dictatorial predecessor, Kim I1-Sung. North Korean people
venerated Kim I1-Sung and placed him on a pedestal with "godlike
stature."' 37  During his lifetime, the Great Leader supposedly defeated
Japanese colonial forces almost single-handedly. 131 When he passed away,
thousands of cranes allegedly descended from heaven in order to retrieve his
body. 139 However, "the birds couldn't take him away because they saw that
all North Koreans cried and screamed and pummeled their chests and pulled
out their hair."'140 Moved by such an outpouring of affection, the cranes let
the body remain in his $900 million palace, deemed a "heavenly palace built
on earth."' 14 1 To this day, the mummified body of Kim I1-Sung reigns as
"President for Eternity." 1
42
North Korean citizens are not allowed to practice any religion aside
from the Kim family cult. 143 This cult is unprecedented, holding that "[Kim
Jong-I1] and his father are like God and Jesus Christ."' 144 Kim I1-Sung
instituted an elaborate religious doctrine, creating a North Korean Holy
Trinity comprised of himself, his mother, and his son, the "Dear Leader."'
145
Also, as an act of social responsibility, the entire North Korean race is
required to willingly sacrifice its life for its "Dear Leader," should he deem
it necessary. 146
North Korea's penchant for lying is not limited to the international
community but is exercised rampantly through the flow of controlled
137. Id.
138. Lee, supra note 64, at 125.
139. Carlson, supra note 15.
140. Id.
141. Id. The $900 million palace referred to here is Kim Sung-l's Kumsusan Palace and it is
now the site which holds the Great Leader's mummified corpse under glass. Id.
142. Id. Despite this fact and despite the holding that the practice of the Greek Orthodox
religion is strictly forbidden, Kim Jong-Il has still built an elaborate Russian, Greek Orthodox-style
church, merely for his personal pleasure. Id.
143. Oh & Hassig, supra note 125.
144. Carlson, supra note 15.
145. Anne Penketh, God is Dead. Long Live Kim II Sung, THE INDEP., Sept. 17, 2004,
http://www.independent.c(.uk/news/world/asia/god-is-dead- im-il-sung-546564.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2008).
146. Oh & Hassig, supra note 125. The Dear Leader's commands to his people regarding self-
sacrifice stem from his personal fear regarding his own safety. Id. Not only is the entire population
commanded to be a buffer between the leader and an attacker, but the most loyal of his military
soldiers have been recruited as special, personal guards. Id.
141
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information to its own people. 147 Its propaganda machine has functioned for
so long that it is virtually impossible to decipher what is myth and what is
reality.' 48  The North Korean people have been indoctrinated with these
"facts" their entire life, to the point where questioning the validity of them
seems unthinkable. 1
49
In light of the negotiation strategies of Pyongyang that the global
community has already witnessed, observers must ponder how such
indoctrination at home affects North Korea's interactions abroad. "North
Korea's behavior regarding nuclear weapons has led many American
sources-ranging from scholars and politicians to comedians and talk show
hosts-to suggest that North Korea acts and speaks in a crazy and irrational
manner."' 150 To the contrary, many North Koreans believe that Kim Jong-I1
is actually a "very bright, very daring, very bold dictator who knows how to
control his society and act strategically to shock" his people and the
globe.' 5 ' His mysteriousness is a source of "leverage and power."' 152 He is
manipulating the traditional leader-worshipping Korean culture, and who is
to say he has not even bought into it himself. 153
Perhaps the most important tool to possess before entering a negotiation
is an understanding of the opponent. 114  With this in mind, it would be
valuable to know if one party approaches the negotiation table holding the
belief that he is god or the son of god, or, at the very least, that he is justified
in indoctrinating his entire population to believe that he is deity in some
capacity. It would be difficult for a dictator to be revered as god by an entire
147. Tan, supra note 13, at 536. "North Korea pumps a steady stream of lies to its own
populace." Id.
148. See The Many Faces of Kim Jong-Il, supra note 59; see also Carlson, supra note 15.
149. See The Many Faces of Kim Jong-Il, supra note 59. U.S. diplomats have even been quoted
as labeling Kim Jong-Il as a "madman." See Laura McClure, Understanding Kim Jong II,
SALON.COM, Jan. 10, 2003, http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/01/10/korea/index.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
150. Tan, supra note 13, at 533.
151. McClure, supra note 149 (quoting Dr. Kongdan Oh, coauthor of "North Korea Through
the Looking Glass"). This is another way that Kim Jong-II's negotiation style resembles other
famous dictators. Id. "In that sense he's no different from a person like Stalin or Saddam Hussein,
and in many ways he's actually been more successful." Id.
152. The Many Faces of Kim Jong-Il, supra note 58 (quoting Han S. Park, Director, University
of Georgia's Center for the Study of Global Issues). The reasoning behind such assertion involves
the thinking that the maintenance of uncertainty directly translates into increased power, which, in
my analysis, is debatable. See id.
153. McClure, supra note 149. "[Kim Jong-Il] can combine an olden-days Confucian style
mindset, where the ruler is always respected and regarded to be almost a different species, with the
traditional Korean mindset, which is very much a father-worshipping, leader-worshipping culture,
and he's manipulating that kind of mentality." Id.
154. Goldstein & Weber, supra note 68, at 329.
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population of people for his entire lifetime, then, expect to be comfortable
being treated as a peer-or in all actuality an "evil" tyrant-by his new
negotiation partners. At the absolute minimum, such an expectation would
affect his negotiation style.
A fundamental consideration of a party as it enters into a negotiation is
autonomy, 155 and this is the exact capacity that a sincerely believed delusion
of divinity affects. A party postures itself through assertions, offers, and
counter-offers based upon how much independence it has, its relative
bargaining position, and its perceived ability to make decisions.'56 If that
party perceives itself as god, it naturally will assume that it commands the
greatest level of independence, possesses an ideal bargaining position, and
has a superior level of decision-making ability. Therefore, the party no
longer feels bound by anything asserted by its inferior negotiation
counterpart or even by any kind of humanity-wide common moral code.
Abstractly, if people sincerely believe they are deity in the flesh, their
moral compasses shift from standards commonly held throughout the rest of
humanity to a more egocentric system. If they are god, they can-and by
definition have the right to-choose who lives and dies. 5 7  Starving an
entire race of people in order to have funds for elaborate self-celebration-
much less lying, breaking promises, and continuing nuclear weapons
development for global economic blackmail (as seen in recent North Korean
history)-shifts from being a humanitarian atrocity to a divine strategic
choice. '58
From a Western mindset, many people find this absurd and can hardly
believe that, even if the entire North Korean population has been duped by
this dictator, Kim Jong-I1 could sincerely believe and act from such a
paradigm.'5 9 If this paradigm is boiled down to the lowest common
denominator, it shows that Kim Jong-I1 is a spoiled tyrant who has been
155. Id. at 332. This assertion is derived from the basic principle that parties enter a
negotiation process at the most fundamental level because they perceive themselves as having some
level of power derived from any number of sources, and that level of power can be used to influence
the outcome of the particular situation. Id. Whatever "bargaining chips" a party possesses will be
used to that party's advantage. Id.
156. Id. Leverage is a critical principle that is involved in every negotiation. Id. "Usually one
side will have more bargaining chips than the other and will seek to take advantage of that fact." Id.
157. See Oh & Hassig, supra note 125 (referring to the example of the Dear Leader instructing
the general population to be willing to sacrifice its life for his own, as an act of social responsibility).
158. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
159. See Kang, supra note 58.
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venerated as being divine by his own people for a long time.160 If that is
true, at the very least, public disrespect will not be tolerated, as was seen by
Pyongyang's response to being branded as "evil."' 16' Also, the request that
North Korea cease production of nuclear weapons is stated as seeking the
greater good of all humanity but is heard as an undermining question from a
lesser authority to North Korea's autonomy in the decision to continue an
action that it has already deemed appropriate. Further, Pyongyang perceives
talking about such an undermining assertion as a viable option, only to the
extent that it reveals to the world who is "truly" in power. 162
Based upon such a premise, and getting to the heart of the global
community's problems today, this mindset by the Dear Leader filters all the
way down to undermine the very foundation of any agreement that can be
reached. Aside from the aforementioned Communist-style strategic reasons
for agreement violation, 163 if a leader in this position has an inflated
perception of his own autonomy, belittles outside authority, and deems that
moral codes are not applicable to him, then the natural conclusion is that he
believes he is not bound by any agreement he makes or any paper he signs.
These papers merely become vehicles to extract as much benefit for himself
as he can, and to appease foreign meddlers while he continues his self-
sanctioned behavior. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Agreed
Framework of 1994 deteriorated amidst opportunistic lies and broken
promises.64 With this in mind, the world watches its television screens with
little hope as the deadline for the September Agreement comes and goes
without promises being fulfilled.
160. See Lee, supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (describing the alleged official
account of the divine birth of the Dear Leader); supra note 135 and accompanying text (indicating
that Kim Jong-Il was revered as "the son of god" since birth); supra note 149 and accompanying text
(showing that the North Korean people have been systematically indoctrinated in the deity of Kim
Jong-Il and his father throughout their entire lives).
161. See infra note 166 and accompanying text; supra note 16 and accompanying text (showing
that North Korea responded by classifying this statement as "little short of a declaration of war" and
pledged to "mercilessly wipe out the aggressors").
162. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (articulating the extent to which North
Korea, following the example of Communist countries generally, views negotiations as a different
form of battle).
163. See Jong-hwan, supra note 105 (indicating that North Korea has studied and utilized the
negotiation strategy of other Communist countries); see also Jong-hwan, supra note Ill and
accompanying text (quoting Kim li-Sung as saying that such a negotiation strategy is used to "bide
time," "weaken our enemies," "obtain favorable international opinion," and "drive the enemy into a
comer").
164. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (reflecting the series of events that proved to be
the unraveling of the Agreed Framework); Tan, supra note 13 (indicating that the event which began
the unraveling process of the Agreed Framework was when U.S. intelligence discovered a large
underground facility that had the capability to support nuclear weapon development).
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Some scholars believe that the Dear Leader's "god-ship" only applies to
his relationship with the North Korean people, while others fear that such
delusions have seeped into other international affairs. 165  Regardless, the
existence of the delusion of deity that Kim Jong-I1 holds is undeniable, and
at the very least, it should be considered when attempting to understand
influences upon North Korea's nuclear negotiation strategy. It has likely
played a strong but unspoken role in the difficulties experienced thus far and
will continue stealthily in the future.
APPENDIX: EVENTS SURROUNDING THE SIX-PARTY TALKS IN BEIJING 166
DATE NUCLEAR STANDOFF
October 21, 1994 "Agreed Framework" reached between North
Korea and United States in Geneva,
Switzerland.
Mid-August, 1998 United States intelligence discovers nuclear
facility.
August 24, 1998 North Korea fired Taepo Dong-1 missile
over Japan.
January 29, 2002 President Bush's State of the Union speech
branded North Korea as part of an "axis of
evil."
October 4, 2002 North Korea acknowledged its nuclear
weapons development program to
Ambassador James Kelly.
November 14, 2002 KEDO announced the discontinuance of
heavy oil supply to North Korea.
December 12, 2002 The United States declared the nullification
of the Geneva Agreed Framework with
North Korea.
December 27, 2002 North Korea purged the IAEA inspectors
from its territory.
December 29, 2002 The United States adopted a 'tailored
165. Kang, supra note 58.
166. Lee, supra note 2, at 107-16 (discussing the events surrounding the Six-Party Talks); Tan,
supra note 13, at 532-33 (discussing the discovery of Agreed Framework violations); Cronin, supra
note 22, at 54; Kim, supra note 3, at 194; Crook, supra note 41, at 217; N. Korea: U.S. Not
Delivering Aid, supra note 47.
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containment' policy against North Korea.
January 10, 2003 North Korea withdrew from NPT.
March, 2003 Japan launched two monitoring satellites,
constructed a new intelligence headquarters,
and initiated acquisition of anti-missile
systems.
April 14, 2003 North Korea announced its acceptance of
new multilateral talks for resolution of
nuclear problem.
April 23, 2003 Trilateral Talks (DPRK, United States,
China) in Beijing.
August 1, 2003 North Korea agreed to participate in Six-
Party Talks.
August 27-29, 2003 First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing,
China.
September 19, 2005 "September Agreement" where NK
committed to abandon its nuclear weapons
program.
September, 2005 China freezes laundered North Korean funds.
October 9, 2006 North Korea detonates nuclear explosion.
October 14, 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1718.
February, 2007 North Korea begins to disable its nuclear
facilities.
December 31, 2007 North Korea misses deadline to declare
nuclear programs, issues statement regarding
"strengthening war deterrent capabilities."
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